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! Even after a decade of outstanding 
economic growth and the political shift to the 
left in most countries, socio-economic 
inequality remains stunningly persistent in 
Latin America. However, while the majority of 
research in political science has focused on 
social or economic policies to explain this 
phenomenon, fiscal policy as a first step of 
private wealth distribution is much less 
studied. Of course there is widespread 
knowledge on the regressive, inequality 
enhancing effect of the countries’ fiscal 
systems, but studies that shed light on the 
political economy of fiscal policy and 
particularly of tax reform are hard to find. This 
is why the book Mobilizing Resources in Latin 
America by Omar Sanchez deserves attention 
as it could enrich the discussion on inequality 
and redistribution in Latin America. And 
although Sanchez, a political scientist from 
Texas State University, doesn’t originally peg 
his analysis to the question of inequalities, his 
two case studies of tax reform history in 
Argentina and Chile in the 1990’s give great 
insight into the actor constellations and 
context variables that led to the neglect of 
inequality reducing tax reforms in both 
countries. Moreover, his description of the 
political economy of tax policy responds to the 
question why in the long run some developing 
countries are able to enhance their revenue 
collection efforts, while others fail to do so (2).   
Via an institutional approach, which 
combines the analysis of formal and informal 
institutions, Sanchez chronologically tracks 
the evolution of tax policy in Argentina 
(Chapter 1 and 2) and Chile (Chapter 3 and 4) 
in the 1990s. His main goal is to explain the 
different development paths in tax policy, with 
Chile being labeled as a successful and 
Argentina as a “failed” case. To explain this 
variation, he stresses the concept of 
institutional strength, that is “the ability of a 
country’s formal and informal institutions to 
aggregate and mediate conflicting societal 
interests” (4). Sanchez explicitly takes a 
couple of variables into account, which add up 
to this concept. May these be formal, as for 
example state strength (degree of stateness), 
the party system, civil society actors, 
institutions that foster macroeconomic and 
fiscal discipline or informal, such as the 
presence of “politicas de estado’’ (a form of 
overarching common sense politics), 
clientelism and specific patterns of decision-
making. In sum, these variables are not only 
relevant via their design but also due to their 
influence to explain variation in tax policy. 
Sanchez recapitulates his empirical findings 
and compares the two cases in more detail at 
the end of the book (Chapters 5 and 6).  
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One important conclusion Sanchez draws 
from his analysis is that the consolidation of a 
national tax system depends less on the 
technical expertise than on the quality of the 
political institutional endowment. This is where 
he detects the major difference between 
Argentina and Chile. While in Chile, as he 
argues, there was a unwritten consent of 
maintaining fiscal discipline among social and 
political actors, which was crucial for the great 
policy convergence in the political bargaining 
processes, in Argentina such a consent has 
been absent, even in the heydays of 
neoliberal reform. Another core institutional 
variable Sanchez emphasizes is the level of 
party system institutionalization. As he rightly 
observes, political parties can serve as arenas 
of mediation and, if institutionalized, make 
policies more sustainable. Thus, for him the 
institutionalized party system can explain 
much of the process of tax reform and 
outcome in Chile, while its absence can 
explain part of the triumph of special and 
corporative interest in Argentina.  
In describing the Chilean experience, 
Sanchez divides the period between 1989 to 
2001 into two phases: One period in which the 
Concertación government sought to use fiscal 
policy to contribute to the irreversibility of the 
still fragile democratic project by allocating 
more funding for social projects. This period 
was marked by cooperative consensus-
seeking politics, which allowed the 
government to pursue some revenue 
enhancing tax reforms. In the second period, 
lower economic growth, tensions inside the 
government coalition and more aggressive 
opposition parties made intends for 
progressive, socio-economic equality 
enhancing, tax reforms unfeasible. During this 
time, the governments of Eduardo Frei and 
later Ricardo Lagos were merely able to enact 
a number of supply-side tax reductions always 
assuring their revenue-neutrality. In addition, 
they shifted their attention to the struggle 
against tax evasion to fuel state coffers. 
Nevertheless this anti evasion policy, albeit 
successful, was less planned than ‘’by 
default’’ (86), given the fact that “the political 
climate was still infertile for revenue 
enhancing tax reform”.  
For the Argentinean case, Sanchez tells a 
completely different tax story. Argentina 
serves Sanchez as a prime example for the 
weak quality of public institutions, which 
explains great part of the stop and go in fiscal 
policy and the inefficient tax code and 
administration. In his view tax policy of the first 
Menem government was highly influenced by 
the institutional legacy from the dictatorship 
and the troubling Alfonsín years, which 
resulted in a chaotic legal tax code and poor 
overall tax collection. Against this background, 
the first Menem government enacted an 
aggressive program of free market policies, 
within which tax policy had to “rapidly yield the 
greatest amount of additional resources, 
regardless of the sectorial or household 
income distribution” (95). Moreover, tax policy 
was regularly planned and executed top-down 
via presidential decree without the 
participation of Congress. With the 
implementation of the currency board the 
situation got even worse, because thereafter 
the primary goal was to constantly upraise the 
overall tax burden and to restructure the tax 
system. It gets quite clear that socio-economic 
equality has never even considered as a goal 
in tax policy. Sanchez describes the second 
term of the Menem government and the 
following Alianza government as much more 
marked by political conflicts. These conflicts 
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arose due to the worsening external economic 
environment, pushing the government to 
extract new fiscal resources via tax hikes and 
the rising opposition inside the government, 
the Peronist party and social actors. Sanchez 
assesses the Alianza administration as even 
less successful, as it failed to contain 
declining revenues. 
Although Sanchez analysis is impressive 
because of its dense empirical description and 
clear structuring, the presentation of the study 
is less convincing. It remains unclear why no 
reference to fiscal data is made. Diagrams, 
charts or other statistics are painfully missing. 
Furthermore, some doubts about Sanchez’ 
theoretical and methodological approach 
remain. Sanchez is certainly right in stressing 
the importance of informal institutions in tax 
policy reform and he can convincingly show 
their importance, but a clear theorizing about 
the interplay of formal and informal institutions 
is missing. Likewise, given the fact that 
Sanchez assembles his explanatory variable 
‘institutional strength’ with different variables 
in the two cases, the concept appears 
somehow arbitrary and may be difficult to 
generalize.  
Moreover, given the recent development of 
the tax systems in both countries, it would be 
necessary to incorporate possible ways of 
institutional change into the analysis. Which 
conditions would really have to change in 
order for tax policy making to become 
sustainable and equality enhancing? 
Nonetheless, Sanchez’ contribution deserves 
attention because of his dense empirical 
description and his focus on societal and 
political conditions for tax reforms. Further 
research should expand and specify the 
presented arguments and case selection, as 
well as entail other methodological 
approaches. This would certainly enrich the 
discussion on inequality decreasing tax 
reforms, which seem to be so difficult to 
achieve in Latin America. ! 
  
 
 
 
